

GEN: Good morning, Colin Powell.

SAM: General Powell. How are you? This is Sam and Katya.

GEN: Hi, Katya. How are you?

KATYA: Good morning. I'm fine thank you.

GEN **[Unintelligible - 00:00:18]**

KATYA: **[Unintelligible - 00:00:19]** That's the hello, Sam.

SAM: I got it. I was there.

GEN: Sam is a little slow, but he got it.

SAM: I got it.

General, I know we have a limited amount of time with you, so I thought we'd launch into what we're trying to accomplish here: our thesis, where we would love to have your help. And then, get into the interview, if that's okay.

GEN: Okay.

SAM: What we're trying to accomplish and what we're not addressing with this current initiative.

What we're trying to do is effectively draw the lessons and universal principles from the military transformation, post-Vietnam, about how that dramatically change the course of large challenged institutions. This is meant to be objective research. We've limited our scope to principles of institutional change in large scale organizations that are critical to American society. We're looking for drivers of success and ways to scale success and then apply these to the educational reform movement in the United States. And while there are lots of micro-experiments in education reform occurring across the country. Our view is that no one has yet

figured out how to scale these successful efforts across a significantly sized system like that which we have in the United States.

Our thesis, in a nutshell -- and we've seen your TedEx presentation where you speak about the importance of structure and the gift of a good start and our emerging majority and minority nation. We've also gone into your organization as you suggest America's promise. We've looked at the Building a Grad Nation report in 2012, where the two objectives of a civic martial plan are laid out: a 90% graduation rate by 2020 and 6 out of 10 high school graduates attending college by 2020. It details the close relationship between education and economy, particularly in terms of lost wages and opportunities.

It offers a set of very compelling initiatives closing the skills gap, redesigning the middle grades, establishing mentoring partnership, et cetera. Our effort is focused on identifying and applying the lessons from a military that was in disarray following the Vietnam War and through a number of different policy and leadership efforts, transformed itself into the most efficient and powerful bureaucracy in the world, culminating in the Gulf War in the early '90s.

We understand that all of these lessons are obviously not directly applicable to the education reform movement and to education as an institution in the United States. But our belief is that there are a number of those lessons that must be applied to leading the national education system in a more positive direction, where talent among teachers, in particular, is rewarded with mediocrity and poor performance isn't tolerated and where results, in terms of graduation rates, and other metrics are achieved more routinely because of the centralized systems that are put in place and the demands that are made of States, School Districts, and schools to enforce fundamental change.

I guess where we're looking to you really for your guidance and extraordinary experience is -- we're looking to you to reflect on how and why the military changed from the organization that was pre-Vietnam to such a high-performing organization, and identifying those issues for us so we can bring those to education reformers, and in many ways, confront these education reformers with those issues.

With that, I'll just leave it there and see if you have any initial questions or thoughts. If not, just allow Katya to dive into the interview.

GEN: Yes, a couple of points. One, from what I've read, you've been working on this for quite a while and you want to put a monograph out this spring so you must be pretty far along with you have found and what you've concluded.

SAM: Yes. I think we are reasonably well along. I would say this is not faked by any stretch of the imagination and we've just started the interview process. You are our first interview, in fact, from the military side. We also have a bunch of other military interview set up, as well as ed reform interviews. So, there is ample opportunity right now to shape and reshape this. I also suspect that, just given the intensity of this effort, it's going to go past spring for publication.

GEN: Secondly, are you familiar with the work being presented by Eli Broad and his various organizations?

SAM: Yes, very much, sir. Eli Broad has actually been involved in funding Success Academy, which I think you know of the charter school network.

GEN: Yes, I'm very much familiar with Success Academy, and the work they've done there, and a lot of other similar programs of charter schools. My wife is on the board for Teach for America for a while and involved in a lot of these programs.

The second comment, before Katya starts, is when we talk about transforming the Army after 1971, let's say, or '72 really that's the period when we went to the All Volunteer Force and Vietnam was essentially winding down. It wasn't as if we had no anchor. We essentially started going back to the way we used to treat our soldiers; in the way we used to take care of our soldiers. We had a pretty good army that went to Vietnam in 1962 to '65, we started to re-learn a lot of lessons. At the same time, we did make some important changes.

Perhaps, the most significant change, which turned out to be a benefit, was that we went to all volunteer force. I was a Battalion commander at the time and a White House Fellow in the middle of all that. And we didn't like it, we felt we were being abandoned by the American people. To some extent we were. But, it gave us so much more flexibility to deal with disciplinary problems and to have people in the army who wanted to be there. That turned out to be an enormous benefit as we came through the early '70s, another would say through my brigade command time at the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division in '76/'77. By then, if you weren't performing, if you're giving us trouble, we just fired you. That was not something that we could do earlier. It was a major factor in making the All Volunteer Force work. Realizing that we had to pay them a decent wage and we had to give them decent facilities. It looked like a more promising environment, in which to live, than it had been before that. I'll just stop there and Katya, ask what you want.

KATYA: Thank you very much, sir. It's an honor to speak with you and I just want to thank you for your service on all fronts and capacities, and for taking the time to speak with us. You have already actually started on my first question, and if you could expand please, based on your tremendous insight and living through and seeing through and contributing to that transformation over the years, and then, being the success of it in the Gulf War, what would be two or three, maybe, additional key specific drivers

that made the change possible and successful. You mentioned the Volunteer Army. What would you identify as few other key tools?

GEN: Perhaps, the most significant factor in all of these was a recognition on our part that we had just, or in the process of losing a war, and that we were losing the contact we had with the American people. We were living in an environment where the country was in very difficult straights. You have to consider the environment '68 to '74. Martin Luther King had been killed in 68, Bobby Kennedy killed in '68. Kennedy, the president, killed in '63. Now, we see race riots in our country, counter-drug culture and anti-military mood. And B=before this was all over, we had a President resign in disgrace, and the Vice President resign in disgrace. And there was still a Soviet Union that was a threat to us. It was all of that coming together that convinced the army – and this is what you have to deal with any large bureaucratic organization – is convince them that you have to change, that you have to transform. It's one of the problems were facing in our country right now, with a Congress that doesn't realize that they better start thinking about new ways of doing business, because they're all crying to themselves to death. But the army faced the reality. It faced the reality with leaders like Bill DePuy. I think Bill was a key to it all, but Bernie Rogers and so many others were involved. And I was in that group with DePuy, he read my work. We realized we had to change. Without that realization, we maybe just continued stumbling along.

If they hadn't got rid of the draft, we probably would not have produced the kind of army that we had in the late '70s or early '80s and into the '90s. And so I would say the fact that we had not succeeded and we had to change. If you don't realize the need for a change, if you haven't looked in the mirror, then, you've got a problem.

The second one was, when we went to all-Volunteer Force, we had to create an environment for paid labor. We no longer had free manpower. We have to compete for these people in an open marketplace. We had to

get better salaries, better facilities. We had to realize that they were going to be married more than they had been before. And so, the whole demographic of the army changed. We needed childcare facilities. We needed better dental clinics. And we did all of that. We created an environment that would support this kind of transformative change.

The next thing we had to do was to get back to some basic standards. When I was a battalion commander, some young soldier from another outlet was transferred to me, came in and said, the story is in my book, one of my first books, "Hey, Colonel, you got problems, race problems in this battalion, I'm here to help you." I said, "Guess what? You're out of here. You're leaving. No more coffee clatches, no more sitting around chatting with the troops at night. I am in charge, you're not." We took charge of the army, again. The leadership in the army started applying high standards which I think goes directly to your efforts with schools, high standards, the uncompromising respect to those standards and the values that the system is putting forth. And frankly, toughest is, enforcing those high standards. And that's I think what brought us out.

Secondly -- well, not secondly. I'm not sure what number I'm up to now -- but we had two terrific leaders at that time -- Bill DePuy and Hank Emerson, and a lot of other names I rattle off which you, I'm sure, are well-aware about the research yourself. We also had something that helped us. That was, we still had a threat. We had a Soviet Union massed on the iron curtain. We had 300,000 plus soldiers in Europe. We needed a strategy. Because that threat was still there, and there was still a Chinese threat, although it was changing, but because the Soviet Union was still there, we had something to focus on. And so, the strategy developed in the early '70s moved away from counter-insurgency and fighting in the jungles in South-East Asia to a major conventional war against the Soviet Union on the plains of Europe. Now, that was still a real threat, even though, in the next 15 or 20 years, it went away. But, it was a guiding life

force. If you look what DePuy was doing, and all the others who were working on it, that's the strategy we developed and strategy we worked on. It gave us a guiding star to follow, the Soviet Union.

You there?

SAM: Yes, we got that.

KATYA: Yes. Thank you.

GEN: To summarize, we came out a failure that caused us to say, "Uh, oh, we can't continue. We got to change." We had to have something that drives change and makes changes special. Secondly, you have to put the resources behind it. Third, you have to have inspired leaders. And fourth, it helps if you have -- I wouldn't call it a threat in your case, but something that you're driving against. In the case of education, I think it's a lower dropout rate, higher high-school graduation rates, more technical schooling and not just college, but college as well, and improving standards in college too.

KATYA: Yes, I agree. Thank you, sir. To follow up on it, argument could be made that we're now in the environment, maybe, a different scale but also tremendous national challenges with a lot of things at risk. And also, many problems are known in the education, and a lot of solutions are known to some extent. But how can we create this drive to get the different stakeholders on the same page in an institution where, unlike the military, education is a disaggregated institution -- federalism principles. Could you share any insights you might have on how to get such a disaggregated institution, with lots of different stakeholders, on the same page? And what catalysts could we muster to get people to realize and look in the mirror, as you suggest?

GEN: Well, that's one of the points I made in my first email back to you all. That was that you are looking at a disaggregated system that is alive, or

will remain disaggregated. I don't think you're going to find state authorities and a lot of local authorities, sitting around, willing to join some single national effort.

KATYA: Agreed.

GEN: Yes. "No child left behind," and those sorts of programs had some success in opposing standards and testing, but it really hasn't change this disaggregated system. What I have found is that, I think I mentioned this in one of my emails, I have seven schools named after me: elementary and middle schools. I'm very proud of all of them. I've visited all but one, and I got another one about to be named after me. The reason they're named after me is their brand new. They haven't been named after anyone else.

They are beautiful -- the physical facilities are outstanding. There are computer labs. There's nothing you would want for in these facilities. They have involved parents. They have parent who will show off for Parent-Teachers Conferences. Everything else you want parents to do. They have high success rates in graduation rates. They are usually in a suburban community that has tax base to support it. Now for one of us to go in there and say, "Okay, look. You got it. This isn't the way we should do it. You should remake them. We have a national top planner, a national [unintelligible - 00:16:37]. Do you follow?" I think it's going to be tough.

But, if you take that and go to some of my little TedT's with Mr. Cruz and Chris in Brooklyn, you look at the high schools and federal schools in Brooklyn, and Sam, you know this well, they don't have those kinds of facilities. They don't have those kinds of community. They don't have that kind of parental involvement. They don't have that kind of tax base. And so, many of these kids, in the 16 hundred dropout fact, which my wife talks about all the time, are essentially in single-parent households

with low income. A single-parent is usually a woman who is of limited means and, perhaps, limited education. It's hard to expect this lady, with a grandmother in many cases, to create the kind of opening environment, opening game that the youngster needs. That's where we have to really, really focus our attention.

I don't know, Katya, if you really can come up with a single overarching concept similar to the military that will apply to this disaggregated system. One of the great benefits of the military system is we can order people and tell them what to do.

KATYA: Yes.

SAM: That'll help.

GEN: A lot to do with it.

"This is our strategy. Anybody got some questions?" No.

"Okay, this is what we're going to do. Anybody got any questions?" No.

Everybody falls in. Everybody wears the same uniform. So, there's a hierarchical structure of force that the military has that can force people to do what the military want them to do. It's hard to really see a direct parallel to education.

KATYA: Thank you. I'd like to emphasize, we'll recognize the difference. This is definitely one of those fundamental differences between the two systems. We are, by no means, advocating a national education system that's not been there from the way the American way in education is federalism and disaggregation. That's going back to the basics parallel, historically, I think. So, the challenge is, and where were looking for potential lessons, and this may come from your experience beyond the military as well and working with different policy actors and different departments, in other walks of life and service is, in that kind of disaggregated system, are there

leadership insights and lessons on how to get different stakeholders with different objectives, but the shared goal of taking care of our kids. How can we work on getting people on the same page, one? And two, how can we scale the successes that we do know exist?

GEN: Well, my experience with other organizations, whether it be in National Security Council when I was National Security Adviser, or Secretary of State, is that you can't run a very successful organization unless all the stakeholders are on your sheet of music. The term right to use is that we all have to be in harmonic with each other. The way you bring people in harmonic with each other is that we're all singing the same tune. If given a common purpose that they all understand, and they all understand their role in achieving that kind of purpose. [00:20:00] You've got to do is to see that the stakeholders -- as you call them, or the followers as I might call them -- believe in that purpose.

And so, that's the trick. How do you get everybody to believe in a common purpose? You say that's not what you're trying to do, but you then come right back to it. You say, "How do we create something that everybody will buy into?" That's going to be hard. In the military, what we did that I think is applicable is standards, meeting standards, constantly raising standards as they are met, training people to meet those standards, quality instructors -- all the things that make a school successful -- the kind of work that Sam has been doing with this academy.

KATYA: Yes.

SAM: General.

GEN: Yes?

SAM: General, just a quick clarification there. As you well know, the Teachers' Unions in the United States present a unique challenge in some cases to reform. Was there an equivalent institution that presented a similar

challenge to reform in the US military after 1972? Is there anything, at all, that can be drawn?

GEN: Not really. There was always a debate within military, and they're having it again now. It happens every 15 or 20 years. I almost laugh about it. Between the light infantry guys and the heavy infantry guys; between the airborne guys and the mechanized guys. Which should get the focus of attention? Which strategy is most important? Whose tactics are most important? That will always, in the army now, everybody says, "Oh, what we need are drones and special forces." That's kind of a little shift again.

What we had to do in that instance was to make sure that we can create a strategy that everybody have piece of the action. And so, when we were focusing on heavy forces to fight the Russians, we didn't eliminate the airborne divisions. Almost some people wanted to do that. We had to bring people along. We had to tell sergeants and young officers, to include myself: "You can no longer curse as you do your daily morning runs. Because there are too many women now around, and you can't court, so shut up." You had to change attitudes. We're now a married force, and so, you got to consider the needs of the married soldier.

Those kinds of issues came up but they were dealt with. My first trainee give every stakeholder a reason to believe in the new purpose, called volunteer force, and bringing them along, training them, making sure that you can get them to move in your harmonic. If you couldn't, you got rid of them. I had to fire a couple of guys because they just couldn't take it.

SAM: Right.

GEN: Now, the Teachers' Union -- I know many of these folks, Randy is a good friend of mine. I think what we have to do is make them somehow part of the solution, or they will just fight you. They have to be convinced that what you're doing is in the interest of education, in the interest of the teachers, which also have to do with the two issues that are uppermost of

their mind: not getting fired and pay raises. Quite reasonable. I mean, that's not unreasonable for a union to want. Try not to create a system that is going to fight the Union or the unions. Any trust feelings of the teachers, but that will bring them on board.

I mean...

SAM: Do you have any thoughts? Yes, go ahead.

GEN: That's not easy. I would find it the Teachers' Associations, the Randy Whinegarners of the world, and sit down with them and say, "Look. We're not here to break up the unions. We're not here to change your long established patterns of seniority, or what not, but you have to be held to account." You have to meet the highest standards. We should incentivize the system to reward those who have met those high standards of teachings. And by the way, some changes are needed. You have to convince them of the need to make changes. I am not a fan of Randy and her ilk, or sympathetic to this. I think they are willing to dissipate some of this, but they're constantly being told that they are the problem. [00:25:00] And as I say in all of my speeches, and as I said in the talk that you've seen, if the whole education system from mothers arms' to college that has to be dealt with, you just can't keep blaming the teachers. The teachers are [unintelligible - 00:25:06] and education system. But, that's not the correct.

SAM: Right. As you know, the intensity of feeling on both sides has reached such a level that every day you basically sing to the form of tactical warfare being played out in the streets with our schools. The problem, I think, people are coming to some level of consensus. I think people understand the solutions to a lot of the issues we face in the education. They are concluding that the challenge right now, primarily, is one of politics. By politics, they mean: "How do we remove the grasp of the

Teachers' Unions? How do we dislodge them from our legislators at the state level?"

GEN: Well, good luck.

SAM: Yes. Well, it's a challenging problem.

GEN: I would never use that term. "How do we dislodge them from the state-level political structure?" If you go in with, "Okay, we're here to dislodge you," you're going to run a new law." If you're here to say, "What got our teachers. We're with you? We're your best friends, but we've got a problem. We've got this dropout factory. We've got schools that are not meeting standards and teachers that are not meeting standards, and therefore, students that are not meeting standards. You must have ideas to solve this problem. And, what would you like to do?"

Now, they will say, "Give us more money and this, that, and the other." You have to expect that. But, I think you have to find some way to bring them into the process, rather than saying, "We want to dislodge them from the process," because, I don't think that will be successful.

SAM: Did you ever face any comparable levels? Does the military face any comparable level of political oppositions of the reforms in the '70s and '80s?

I know the base closure issue was...

GEN: Base closure issue -- we had to find a solution to that. The way we did was essentially having Congress give us a law that said, "We will send you which bases to close and you got to vote for the whole list." Upper ground, you can't start picking things out. We very cleverly did so that more Congressmen kept their basis than those who lost their basis. Therefore, they voted for "yes." It was pure politics.

The more challenging one was a little bit later in 1991, after the Gulf War, when **[unintelligible - 00:27:52]** and I and President Bush faced the reality that there was no Soviet Union anymore. We had 300,000 folks in Europe. We had an entire system that relied on the existence of the Soviet Union. I had to, as the chairman, cut the chains together and say, “We got to cut. The chains that we want to cut, or we’re going to cut, not the other guy, cut not me.” The most challenging bureaucrat challenge I ever had is getting the chiefs to agree on the cut. And, I just announced the cut when they read in the newspaper by mistake, or maybe, deliberately -- I don’t remember now. We had to cut 25 percent. I got big trouble to saying it, but that’s exactly what we did. We cut 25 percent. We laid off 500,000 soldiers, 250,000 reservist, 250,000 **[unintelligible - 00:28:40]**.

With the chain, I wear around the country telling military industrial complex, “Hey, guess what? No Soviet Union, no new Soviet tanks, no new Soviet airplanes, therefore, we got to cut back. You guys go have a business or merge or return equity to shareholder. They did, because there was a little bit of recession. But, we did it. We came out the other end in good shape. Now, I had to fight like hell for that. I had to fight for Congress who wanted -- some of them wanted to cut more; some of them wanted to cut less. The other fire ahead was that they call the constituency. If I had to go tell Pet Steve who is in Alaska that I was taking out one of the brigades we had just put in a few years earlier, he was mad, but he did it. Same thing with Danny **[unintelligible - 00:29:26]** in Hawai. Same thing with Lean **[unintelligible - 00:29:29]**. We’re going to turn back to where it was a couple of years ago.

It was difficult but we gave them a good reason. What I have said when faced with but to other who’d ask about this kind of question, “How do you do it?” What I said to them is, “If you have to make serious changes, such as what we had to do in 1991 after the Soviet Union ended, don’t wait for the change to be imposed on you.” **[00:30:00]** If I had sat around

with chiefs, and the chiefs sat around, and we didn't decide what we should look like, the Congress would have decided a course.

What you want to do when -- and this comes back to the Teachers' Union, -- what you want to do when you're moving in this direction is come up with a concept that plan that will give your enemy something to attack, so that they're not attacking whatever they choose. You set the boundaries of the debate. Let them attack you and give your champions, your friends out there, something to champion. I think you set a course that will draw both friends and enemies. As you got more friends that you do enemies, you'll prevail. But you just don't stumble along, which is, to a large extent, what's happening in many of our educational systems across the country. I don't think -- I don't know how to do that for the whole country.

SAM: Right. That's one of the elements that we're really wrestling with here on our own, the other element that's related is how do you scale from the bottom once you know something is quite successful. How do you scale that rapidly across the system? We're already facing these sorts of constraints at Success Academy. It's difficult for us to envision getting beyond serving 20,000 kids.

GEN: When I started America's promise in 1997, we had a summon in Philadelphia and in the following Monday, I was sitting alone in my office with two people saying, "Now, what the hell do we do?" And so, we started working on the five promises that you're familiar with. I started to find these successful programs around the country. How do we scale them up? What I discovered, looking at your program, for example, or a Harlen children zone, or I don't know if Elaine Bennett's program here at Washington DC. Lots of programs. We've found lots of them. There are lots of great programs out there. But, when you scale them up, you realize that unless you have an Elaine out there at the other place you want to go to, or you have another Harlen Children Zone kind of leader, something

like him, or a Sam, it's very hard to scale up. What I found is you take a program that's working great, let's say -- I don't know, Orleans, New Jersey -- and you go out to St. Louis and try to replicate it, they want to take a whim. "Don't tell us how to do it. We'll tell you how to do it." So, it's very difficult to scale up.

The most successful scaling up we did was with an established program that was large to begin with. It was the Boy's and Girl's Clubs of America. I was on the board of the Boy's and Girl's Club at that time. They were one of the first joiners of the America's Promise alliance. In the last 15 years, we went from something like -- I think it was 17 hundred clubs to over 4,000. Why? Because it's a model that scales easily. The beauty of the Boy's and Girl's Club is that each community has its own club that scales it up itself. The National Organization provides standards and provides training for leaders, but it's local. And so, these and they're very protective of their local clubs, but they're proud to be part of a larger organization.

To give you another version of that, all of the clubs we have in our military basis, every base has its own team club. The military say this. We don't have a common system over all these clubs in the army, in the airforce, the navy, and the green corp. So what do we do? We gave them all the Boy's and Girl's Club. Every team club, or kid's club we have on our military base now is a subsidiary of the Boy's and Girl's Clubs of America. And so, that scales up, because it was an established program are already demonstrated the ability to scale up. All we had to do is get more attention, more resources and more interest in what we're doing.

The brought us Big Sisters, also as the naval scale up. Not a lot, because it's very hard to find the right kinds of people to serve as one on mentors. You have to be so careful. But it's the naval. I think it doubled. So, what we ended up doing was, rather than trying to scale up a little single program, like Children Zone, or some of the 20,000 Success Academy,

was to just to get more people involved: the American Bankers' Association, the Ridge Carlton. They would start reaching out into their community and show people what standards are. Why do you have to work hard? Why do you have to know the English language?

**[00:35:00]** There are lots of ways that you can educate the youngsters besides schools.

SAM: Can I just take you back to the point you made initially around the All volunteer force and how enormously important that was? I think now, we see very similar challenges at a high level among teachers. There are about 2 million teachers in this country. The average tenure of these teachers tends to be three years or less. The retention rate is pretty poor. We have a 49 percent loss of teachers in Success Academy each year, right now, which is enormous number, and it's a very high performing network. But still, we have enormous loss number. Are there lessons to be drawn from the All Volunteer Force and the exceptional way in which the military manages its human capital that we could translate into the educational arena both in terms of teacher recruitment, retention and training and mentoring? All of that, say, are really big and incredibly important task that's critical to reform.

GEN: Yes, a couple of things I mentioned. One, you have to pay decent salary. I'm sure there are lots of teachers who would not leave if they were earning salaries sufficient to their educational level, or what they see their contemporary is earning, and their own needs and their family's.

Secondly, we had to introduce something that was new to us. That was you recruit a soldier but you retain the family. In other words, you can go out and recruit a soldier, but you better have conditions that within the force that will allow their family to say, "We want to stay." So, you reenlist the family. You recruit your soldier, but you reenlist the family. You have to have a satisfied spouse. You have to have good schools for

the kids. You got to have medical care, child care, all the rest of that stuff. You have to create the right environment. That may not be a direct parallel, but I'm just telling you what really was essential for us to do.

Third, you have to mentor. You have to have inspirational leaders, inspirational principles, inspirational school boards, inspirational chancellors, or whatever you have, that will inspire these people to continue in their profession. You didn't tell me what was the biggest cause of attrition at 40 percent, which is a disaster as attrition rate. Satisfaction?

SAM: No. It's a combination of a couple of factors. First of all, we tend to recruit very young, so directly out of college and train these teachers. After two or three years, they're making other decisions about their long-term careers, whether they want to go into business, law, etcetera. They're heading off to graduate schools and so forth. There's probably there's something that we could do there in terms of financing their graduate school education in return for years of service back at the network, et cetera.

There is, of course, some forced loss because our standards for teachers are incredibly high. And so, that's not necessarily a bad loss. And then, there is a subset of teachers who are quite good, who go on to other charter schools, or charter school networks. That what we're most concerned about. That is a smaller number. It's that larger number of -- very large number actually; disproportioned number -- of folks who want to go and explore their careers and go back to graduate school to do so. That's challenging us.

GEN: Yes. That's something of a problem in the military. Typically, in the last 10 years, you find a very high attrition rate among our academy graduates who serve their five years and they've been there in Iraq or Afghanistan six times and mama says or daddy says, "That's it. We need to find

something else to do.” They’re all like your teachers: highly skilled and very marketable.

What you use to hold them is their commitment to their profession. I’m a soldier. I’m not a shoe salesman. I’m a soldier. And so, somehow, that profession of teaching has to get higher recognition and greater support from the communities throughout America. [00:40:00] Just like our soldiers, I think, to some extent, we’re successful, because the country loves us as soldiers, even though they may not always love the wars we’re in. But, there’s a great deal of respect from being in the military. Teachers deserve that same kind of respect from their communities.

How you create that? I think it’s once again an individual. It’s a lot easy to get that kind of appreciation in one of the schools that I’ve talked about, named after me, that it isn’t say, “Yes, PS 39 and the Bronx, which doesn’t exist anymore, anyway.

SAM: Right. This point around professionalism that you highlight is a really big issue that we’re trying to grapple with in this study because I think you can make an argument that with a few exceptions, depending on the school district and the specific school, the teacher profession, for the most part, doesn’t really exist in the same way that the military and physicians, lawyers, et cetera, think about professions.

GEN: Yes. That’s unfortunate. It should. I mean, it used to.

SAM: Absolutely.

GEN: My recollection is it used to. When I was a kid, it was a very respected profession. These are respected people. They were making a great deal of money, but they love what they’re doing and they’re in it for their life. It’s a life. There was also period when there were more women in education because there weren’t that many other opportunities open to women.

SAM: Correct. That’s right.

GEN: I'm sorry. Did I interrupt you?

KATYA: Oh, no. If there's an opening, I'd like to follow up on the related aspects. From your experience, sir, about extending the JROTC program -- and that's one of those, perhaps, more direct connections and flow between the military and education. If you could speak about how you're able to achieve success in expanding that program. What lessons have been learned there in terms of scaling, in terms of professionalism, and also creating the drive and support network that you talked about in your chapter on, yes, we're mammals and other things? What might be drawn from the JROTC experience?

SAM: What happened was after the Gulf War, there was an outpouring of affection for the troops. We didn't know these kids were so good. We just thought they were people who couldn't get a job. Look at them. My gosh! They're articulate. They're bright. They're running the most complicated machinery. What we need to do is draft everybody and this affects the whole country. And so, my response to that was, "No, we're not going back to the [unintelligible - 00:42:42]. The American people, I want addressed, and frankly, neither does military." And so, I thought about it and I said, "One way we could sort of put that structure back into our society is take a look at the ROTC. I did that.

I had a brigadier general on my staff, Mary [unintelligible - 00:43:03], excuse me, I forgot her last name. She was my J1; my first help person. I actually go study how we could expand the JROTC program. She came back and she said, "The potential is to go from 15 hundred to perhaps 5,000 schools." And so, I did the costing of that, and I could never have gotten that amount of money, but I went to Mr. [unintelligible - 00:43:22] and I went to Mr. Bush, and I asked them to let me go to Congress, get money to double the program to 3,000 schools or there about.

The level at the army at that time was the military bedtime, but we did it. Getting started was a bit of a challenge because you had to convince the school districts that it isn't going to cost you that much. We pay for most of it. You don't have much of a cost, whatsoever. And, I also had to get the services to pay for it. They were resistant. They didn't see it as a recruiting tool. It took some work. It is now close to 3,000, but not surely exact number.

And the funny part of it, the fascinating part of it was how different communities responded. This will bring you back to the original problem. I looked at Texas. Texas had a 110 Junior ROTC High Schools. Pretty good! New York City had -- you want to guess, Sam?

SAM: Let's say, New York City.

GEN: None.

SAM: What's that?

GEN: None. Zero.

SAM: None, is that right.

GEN: Zero. It had zero. And so, Dinkens was the mayor at that time. I went to David and I said, "David, this is ridiculous. This is a free good Germanic. Texas has 110. You got none."

He said, "Well, you know, the teachers won't like it. The principal don't like it. It's militarizing our kids. Bla-bla-bla." And so, let's try it. He agreed. He selected the school in Manhattan. [00:45:00] I got the Airforce to commit to produce, to put a JROTC there that would focus on engineering, science and math, as an Airforce Junior ROTC program. It was going fine. It was about to get established when Dinkens called me one day, and says he can't go there. What's wrong? He said, "It's Martle of the King Junior High School, and Mrs. King is outraged that we would

militarize here school. I can't do it." And he said, can you give it to me in another place in New York?" I said, "No. I just got to go to **[unintelligible - 00:45:26]**. I have a line of people who want these places.

And so, we didn't get it, but then, we finally did break in to New York and we started with my High School, which was more acceptable. The Bronx is no longer quite the same school, but I think you know of it, Sam. We got one at the Mars. We got a few others inside the city. I don't where they're all are. I've seen the one at Mars. I went to an event there and they had a **[unintelligible - 00:45:51]** guard commanded you to form and all of the other students were just applauding and saluting them. It was great.

So, it's up to 3,000, but it's still so dependent on the community. You can start a JROTC detachment and you can find teachers resistant. "We're not sure we want to do this. Why are we doing this?" There's a lot of **[unintelligible - 00:46:13]** out there." But, guess what? After that they established, these kids started walking around saying, "Yes, sir. No, sir." And wearing uniforms and looking sharp, being proud, teachers loved it. In some cases, we have entire school. There's one here at the Marilyn **[unintelligible - 00:46:31]** Military Academy, which is a public high school where every kid is required to be in JROTC. Chicago, every single high schooler Chicago has -- thanks to RD Dunkin -- has a JROTC unit. If I could, I had the money, I'd say, increase it to 6,000, 10,000, whatever the number is. But, you got to be sensitive to the community. San Francisco would not like to have as many JROTC as Dallas, Texas will.

SAM: Right.

GEN: Because, they're all over Texas. They love them. San Francisco, I don't think so. Which brings me back to the point that it is a very decentralized system that is not only geographically decentralized, it's culturally

decentralized. It's racially decentralized. It's ethnically decentralized. That's what makes it so difficult.

SAM: The last point -- that's not unlike the Armed Forces, which is incredibly diverse ethnically and then culturally.

GEN: Not after they get to the boot camp.

SAM: Exactly.

KATYA: It is the lack of chain of command that's the key distinction.

SAM: Yes. And I don't know if I used this in my Ted thing. I never remember what I said these things, because I never have any -- you know, I don't have it. I just know when to start to talk. I can't remember what I said. The point is that we take them all in, ethnically, and in the first years of the All Volunteer Force, when we're no longer drafting, the volunteers were coming in, we're really, basically, to a large extent, unqualified. There were a lot of them who didn't speak English. There were a lot of them that never had seen the graduation ceremony in high school. We had to stop and run high school classes and get on GEDs. We had to have -- my battalion in Korea, we had English as a Second Language every afternoon. And a lot of our training time was spent not on military training, but on bringing these kids up to a high school level education through GEDs, giving them a sense of pride in each other, and if you read about that Korean -- It was, sort of... be a winner. Everybody is a winner. You can be a winner. We had to essentially train that kind of soldier.

And then, as we got into the All Volunteer Force, we slowly raised the standards, so that by the end of the '70s, if you didn't have a high school diploma, we wouldn't let you in. Unlike public schools, we wouldn't take you in if you couldn't pass our ASBAB or if you didn't have a high school diploma. It slipped a little bit because of the wars of the last 10 years, but it's still pretty much the standards we try to achieve. Why do we want a

high school diploma? Because it makes you more educable, if that's the proper word. The real reason we want you to have a high school diploma is it tells us that you stopped with something. You didn't quit. You weren't a dropout, and therefore, you are not liable to drop out of the army. Frankly, that works. [00:50:00] Once we get them, we make them all alike. We eventually [unintelligible - 00:50:05]

I'm sorry...

SAM: What was that, Sir?

GEN: Go ahead.

You don't have that kind of alternative. Public schools have to take in the public.

SAM: Right. Now, having said that, I guess there are these -- and this is what we're trying to figure out, consistent with this theme of scaling-- there are schools in very challenged, diverse communities with populations of kids who don't speak English, coming in to the schools. They manage to create an environment of the [unintelligible - 00:50:46] and coherence and real structure that you emphasized in your TedEx talks and in your books. Those tend to be very successful. Success is precisely that all the kids wearing uniforms. They're expected to behave in a certain way. Kids go to English-Immersion Programs, and so forth. There are models for that, but again, the question, the challenges you pointed consistently is how to centralize that across the country.

GEN: Yes, and if it was left to me, and I could, "Okay, I know this. The same schools." I put everybody in common uniform not because that I want to necessarily see them in uniform. It removes income disparities: the kid who has nice clothes and the kid who doesn't have nice clothes. It removes gang identification. It removes all kinds of problems. It makes them all alike. We can teach you now as a homogenous group, without

everybody sizing everyone else up. But, you can't do that. It works in a charter school. I have a charter school named after me in Detroit where it worked very well. But, it's hard to see how you could oppose that across the country throughout the entire public decentralized school system.

Schools, academy and Children Zones, and places like that, their example is that all across the country, where they could to do that, where they can enforce those kinds of standards and not run into trouble with the community, and especially with the parents, who will stand for it, some, that it works great.

SAM: Yes. I guess, in the parallel to something you discussed earlier, the US Military had a clear and present threat from the Soviets and I guess, to a lesser extent, to Chinese in the '70s and '80s that unified and created the sense of urgency around transformation. In the same way, I guess, the charter schools, present a similar sort of threat to public schools, and that's partly their intent. As you know there is no way to whole **[unintelligible - 00:53:00]** place our public education system with charter schools. That's just impossible. 51 million kids, 100,000 school districts; it's just so -- it will take centuries.

So, the notion is in a discussion we had with Governor Quattermile in New York, he actually drew this analog to the Section 8 housing in the United States, where you when you started to move to Section 8, it created a competition, competitive threat to traditional public housing that forced changes in traditional public housing. It reached an equilibrium where essentially, you have 50 percent traditional public housing, and 50 percent section 8 vouchers.

Our sense is that it similar trajectory for public education. I guess, as you were talking about the threats to the US, maybe, a similar structure. Do you think?

GEN: Yes. I think you have to find a way to strike an accommodation with alternative systems, whether it's chartered or home schooling or what not, so that you're not pointing the dagger at their hearts, which is what happened early on with the explosion of the charter school movement. Two threats that the rest of them solved is that you're taking away all the good students. You're leaving us with the problem. Or, you're sucking away resources. And the third problem was, well, charter schools are not uniformly successful. I think they're here to stay. I think the movement is spreading. I think it'll help to keep reinforcing the reality that they are public schools.

SAM: Right. Katya, do you have any questions?

GEN: I agree with the -- go ahead, Katya.

KATYA: Just the complementary aspects of this whether capitalist -- you talked about the Soviet Union really focused everyone on the same page. [00:55:00] We don't have the Soviet Union. Thank God, although President Ford was working on it. But there are lots of threats out there.

GEN: Take my friend's blood. [Unintelligible - 00:55:23]

KATYA: What's that?

GEN: Taken my friend's blood. That is. Go ahead.

KATYA: Is there used to be moment -- that we've had all kinds of moments that should have been Sputnik moments, but have not resonated with the American public as much. Do you see some external, international relations, global economy-type challenges that could perhaps be, if properly explained to the public, service those catalyzing challenges for the folks to understand we're losing competitiveness perhaps, or we don't want to lose competitiveness, how can we use perhaps, the external global situation to drive internal understanding?

GEN: I don't see that in the same context as the Soviet Union. A lot of my neo-con friends want to make China a new Soviet Union. That won't work. China is too busy selling stuffs to us. That is not going to work.

KATYA: Yes, we owe them a lot of money.

GEN: We owe them a lot of money. Exactly. They don't want to see us have trouble. We don't want to see them have problem. They're not going to be an enemy. But that's the written article in Washington Post about the ascending nature of the Chinese threat, which is absolute nonsense. Any event and [unintelligible - 00:45:31] for all of these problems is not a threat. The little problems we talked about Iran, Afghanistan, in the great scheme of things, these are not world-shaking problems that present an existential threat to the existence of the United States.

We probably have, and the only Sputnik-type thing I can see, is to tell the American people, "Hey, folks. You need to take a look at what's happening with our economy." The below wage jobs, the sowing pieces of thread together jobs are gone. And, increasingly, we are becoming a high-technical society, a server society, and we'd better be teaching our kids that kind of work. We better also be focusing on technical training of our youngsters of a higher level than stay soldering two pieces of metal together. And so, I think that it's going to save our economy by us investing in our schools.

Now, you can so far relates just put out something saying, pointing out the distress of so many kids not able to get into the military and that's certainly true, but we get what we need. We get enough to man the force. The real challenge I think is to the domestic economy -- our economic system. If we don't have people with the skills necessary to fill the job openings that are going to be increasingly complex with respect to the need to be trained for it. I was in South Carolina giving speech not too

long ago, and I was driving back in the airport and night, and then, there's a very depressed part of the town that I was in.

I said, "Jay, what's the unemployment rate down here?"

The guy with me, who was my escort, said, "About 40 percent." I said, "That's terrible."

He said, "Oh, we have lots of jobs. We don't have kids with the skills to fill them. We don't have the youngsters who could read manuals, or could read blueprints. They are not trainable."

If you go most of the industrial companies in America, you will find that it takes a lot longer to train a factory floor worker, than it did 20 years ago, 30 years ago, 40 years ago. You've got to bring them up to a minimum standard of English and Math. And then, you can start training them on a scale. That's what I would be pushing. It isn't very exciting. It's not as exciting as the Russians coming to the fall the gap, but that's the problem we have. That's the problem. That's why we have to take the American people.

SAM: And you're entirely on point there. That's exactly what it is.

GEN: Yes. And, I'm going to have to leave, guys. Is there anything else that really need to cover?

KATYA: Thank you.

SAM: Thank you, General.

KATYA: Just a way ahead, if you may be amenable to any further communications, or might have suggestions, other colleagues we might [unintelligible - 00:59:16]. We really, really appreciate your insights and you were in a unique position to comprehend and provide insights in so many aspects of this. We're just really appreciative. If you have, any time for further

interaction, or any further suggestions, we would really welcome that and appreciate.

GEN: Well, let me know you're not [unintelligible - 00:59:38]. There are a lot of guys that are still around from those [unintelligible - 00:59:41] days. A lot of guys have passed on, though. You need to be looking at guys of my age, or a little younger, who will be majors or lieutenant colonels at that period.

KATYA: Okay.

GEN: West Clark, Barry McCaffrey, George Jollwon. [01:00:00] Those names come to mind.

KATYA: We were planning to interview General McCaffrey, sir.

GEN: Okay. Thank you. Good luck!

KATYA: Thank you so much!

SAM: Thank you very much, General.

GEN: Hey, so what are you doing up there, Sam?

SAM: Thank you, Sir.

GEN: Bye.

KATYA: All right. AT/rj/