



**The Search for Mr. X --
A CENSA Member's Survey on National
Security Doctrine after Containment**

**Final Results
December 2007**

“It isn't 1989 anymore. But it isn't 1939 either.”

Survey Director --- Keith Mines
Assistant Director --- Anne Smedinghoff
Graphics & Design --- Rachel Mines



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Survey compiled by Keith Mines, CENSA Ottawa, Mineskw@hotmail.com, 613-234-0028



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Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| Introduction | 4 |
| Part 1 – Summary Results | 5 |
| Part 2 – Full Results | 8 |
| 1. Early Skeptics | 8 |
| 2. Do We Really Need to go Through This Drill? | 8 |
| 3. Exactly What is it we are Looking for? | 10 |
| 4. Why No Post – Containment Doctrine? | 12 |
| 5. The Threat Picture | 15 |
| 6. The New Mr. X | 15 |
| 7. What do Thematic Groupings Tell Us? | 18 |
| 8. Are We There Yet? | 19 |
| 9. A U.S. or International Concept?..... | 20 |
| 10. Venues for Developing an International Doctrine | 21 |
| 11. A Presidential Doctrine? | 22 |
| Appendix – The X Contenders | 24 |
| 1. Bush Doctrine I – Pre-eminence and Preemption | |
| 2. Bush Doctrine II – Global Freedom | |
| 3. Haass -- Unity and Integration | |
| 4. Barnett – The Core and the Gap | |
| 5. Meade – Forward Containment | |
| 6. Hart – The Fourth Power, Principle-Based Leadership | |
| 7. Fallows – A Containment Strategy for the Age of Terror | |
| 8. Murdoch – Anti-Doctrine, or Just Do it Right | |
| 9. Peters – Extending American Primacy | |
| 10. Mandelbaum – America as World Government | |
| 11. Lieber – America as World Leader | |
| 12. Shapiro – Containment Redux | |
| 13. Kilcullen – Disaggregation | |
| 14. Ignatieff – Post-Westphalianism | |
| 15. Fukuyama I – State Building | |
| 16. Fukuyama II – Realistic Wilsonianism | |
| 17. Lieven/Hulsman -- Ethical Realism | |
| 18. Princeton Project – A World of Liberty Under Law | |
| 19. Zakaria -- Liberalization before Democratization | |
| 20. Richardson -- Define and Contain | |
| 21. Khanna -- New Global Order | |



The Search for Mr. X A CENSA Member Survey

Introduction

Over a long weekend in the winter of 1946 a frustrated young American diplomat sat down in his office in Moscow and wrote “the long telegram” in which he warned that the Soviet Union was inherently hostile to the west and could not be partnered with in building a post-war world. George Kennan turned this telegram into an article in *Foreign Affairs* – “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” that appeared in the July 1947 edition under the byline of “Mr. X.” There he laid out, based on years of experience dealing with communist Russia, the majority of it in Russia, the premise that “*Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant applications of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.*”

U.S. policymakers were at the time searching for a concept around which to organize post-war policy and the advent of nuclear weapons gave urgency to the search, while a constellation of factors was leading others to similar conclusions. Still, it was Kennan who gave us the term and the core Cold War doctrine, containment, which has been described by Eliot Cohen as “a superb, strategic concept: simple, sweeping, flexible. Though intended primarily to shape foreign policy, it served defense policy as well. For more than four decades, containment provided the rationale and conceptual framework around which the U.S. constructed its military establishment.” (*The New Republic*, 19 Jan. 1998)

Dr. Cohen called for a new Mr. X to define the post Cold War world and save America from its “brain-dead two-war strategy.” Alas, Cohen lamented, “this time no formidable new foe looms on the horizon, and there is no doctrine to replace containment.” Six years after the 9/11 attacks we are in the middle of two wars, have gone through a major military transformation, are in the midst of a halting conversion of our diplomatic tools and foreign assistance, and are challenging core constitutional principles as we attempt to keep our society safe. And yet, just as in 1998, we still have no compelling doctrine to provide that overarching, synthesizing concept. This failure may be remembered as one of history’s great intellectual lapses, a time, like 1914, when an age cried out for direction and new ideas, and all it got was more blood, more treasure. In a kinder moment future generations may simply write it all off as too complicated, or decide it really was unnecessary. Still, with the stakes this high, CENSA thought it prudent to at least ask the question “Will the new Mr. X please step forward?”

Part I -- Summary Results

In the fall of 2007 we assembled a cast of 21 potential contemporary X Candidates and sent their views in a survey to CENSA members and friends, with a series of questions meant to spark thought on managing the post 9/11 strategic environment.

- By a margin of two to one, respondents thought that **we do indeed need a doctrine to replace containment**, but they were not clear on whether such a doctrine should flow from grand strategy, or whether grand strategy flows from doctrine, a technical point to be sure, but indicative of the fact that the terms of reference for developing a doctrine might not be clear.
- When asked why we **don't have a successor to containment**, 40% of responses (participants were allowed multiples in this question) pointed to **complexity in the world and diversity of the threat**, while 36% looked to demand (needs of policymakers don't allow for doctrine) and supply (no contemporary Kennan) problems.
- This was supported by another question that asked what the **contemporary equivalent of Soviet expansionism** was when considering the current threat picture: **41%** of responses had to do with **terrorism or radical Islamism**, **24%** articulated a **wide variety of global trends** (energy insecurity, collapse of states, loss of confidence in the west, economic shifts), **15%** looked to country specific threats (Russia, Pakistan, China, Iran), while a significant **20%** thought there **simple was no single galvanizing threat**.
- In the core of the survey participants were asked to select the contemporary thinker who most closely approximates George Kennan in articulating a doctrine around which we could build a coherent post 9/11 policy (they were allowed up to 3). The **winner was Francis Fukuyama, with Parag Khanna as runner up**. Significantly, however, the winner received only 16% of the vote, and the runner up only 9% with 17 candidates receiving between 1.5% and 7.5% of the vote.
- When the candidates were grouped thematically, however, the results were more clear:

| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| -- Bush Doctrines I & II | 1.5% (Pre-eminence/Preemption, Global Freedom) |
| -- Anti-Doctrine | 4.5% (Murdoch) |
| -- American Primacy/Focus | 12% (Peters, Mandelbaum, Lieber, Hart) |
| -- Neo-Containment | 17% (Meade, Fallows, Shapiro, Kilcullen) |
| -- New Global Architecture | 29% (Haass, Princeton Project, Khanna, Lieven/Hulsman) |
| -- State Building | 36% (Barnett, Ignatieff, Fukuyama, Zakaria) |

- While the results confirmed a **predictable lack of consensus**, the highs and lows were nonetheless interesting and the range of views could at a minimum help set the conditions for future work. Certainly the place of **doctrines focusing on state building** and strengthening the nation-state system deserves some attention.
- There was, however, a **lack of true conviction**, with the participants by a margin of 3 to 1 not believing that their candidate was at the level of a George Kennan but rather simply the best we can do.
- Over 62% of participants believed that a new doctrine should be **internationally developed**, with a variety of venues suggested for where international consensus could be found, but 74% also believed that to be effective, such a doctrine would have to be **embraced by the U.S. president**.

Conclusions – “It isn’t 1989 anymore. But it isn’t 1939 either”

This survey is intended to be a starting point, not an end point, in the search for post-containment security doctrine. We hope at a minimum that it has sparked discussion and new thinking on the intellectual framework for keeping our free societies safe. While the survey evinces a lack of consensus around a single candidate, it nonetheless suggests several themes around which such a doctrine could coalesce, and should stimulate thinking on changes to the international system to take account of the new threat environment. As one participant so aptly concluded: **“It is not 1989 anymore. But it is not 1939 either.”** So we end where we began, “Calling Mr. X?”

Looking Ahead

We see several issues that are ripe for further analysis based on this project:

1. **What is Doctrine?:** The question of where doctrine fits in our national security planning system is a valid one that does not seem to be settled. The fact that current presidential doctrines garnered only a fraction of the vote while participants were not in agreement over the doctrine vs. grand strategy question evinces a lack of clarity or rigor on a central issue.
2. **What is the Threat?:** In describing the current threat picture one prominent Presidential candidate spoke of weapons of mass destruction, global terrorists, rogue states, rising powers, weak states, and a warming climate. In recent foreign policy statements published recently in Foreign Affairs this was actually one of the tighter threat pictures by a candidate. Part of what containment achieved was clarifying the threat picture and allowing us for focus. Can we do better in defining and refining what is threatening to our societies?
3. **Do we Focus on Architecture or Issues?:** Should we organize our strategy and policies around a single issue and create architecture that can manage

- that issue, or should we work toward more generic architecture that can manage a range of issues?
4. Where Does State-Building Fit?: The prominence of state building in the survey deserves serious consideration. This does seem to go along with trends and activities over the past five year when there have been halting efforts to improve our post-conflict nation building apparatus, for example. But it is hardly institutionalized and defense and foreign affairs funding would not suggest that it is anything approaching a national priority.
 5. Do we Need New International Architecture?: There have been a number of new national institutions post-9/11 but no real international institutions have been developed in the post Cold War World. Even those thinkers who focused on a single issue generally suggested new architecture to manage that issue.
 6. Can our Political System Keep Up?: The looming question in all of this is whether we have a political system that is capable of generating and promoting the best ideas. Kennan wrote in his Memoirs that “more important than the observable nature of external reality, when it comes to the determination of Washington’s view of the world, is the subjective state of readiness on the part of Washington officialdom to recognize this or that feature of it. . . It is a question which was to plague me increasingly over the course of ensuing years – whether a government so constituted should deceive itself into believing that it is capable of conducting a mature, consistent, and discriminating foreign policy. Increasingly, with the years, my answer would tend to be in the negative.” (John Lukacs, Geogre Kennan, A Study of Character, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, p. 74). Even if Mr./Ms. X emerges, it is anything but a given that his or her ideas will become policy, given current political reality.
 7. What are the Right International Venues?: The primacy that all participants attached to any new security doctrine being international in its scope and development, coupled with the dearth of international venues for arriving at such doctrine, leaves plenty of space for work.
 8. How do we do Collaborative Analysis?: Finally, this project demonstrated the richness and importance of conducting analysis in a collaborate venue rather than in isolation, although many of the best ideas will of necessity start in isolation. Venues for good collaboration in analysis of new ideas are, however, limited. If we have merely moved from conventional conferences to blogs, we probably still have some ways to go. There must be better ways to capture the experience and insights of our best and brightest and turn them into practical policies. This is what CENSA has tried to do with this project, and a large part of what CENSA is all about.


Survey Director: Keith Mines, CENSA Ottawa
Assistant Director: Anne Smedinghoff, CENSA Intern
Graphics and Design: Rachel Mines, CENSA Intern

Part II -- Full Results

1. Early Skeptics: In the preparatory phase of the survey we received two responses by individuals skeptical about the whole idea of searching for a new Mr. X. They shared the following thoughts:

- *“Unfortunately, I think this is an exercise in futility. I believe the search for an historical analogy to help bring U.S. foreign policy out of its current torpor, i.e. finding the “right doctrine” to solve today’s problems, detracts from actually constructing the policies necessary to deal with the problems the US currently faces. . . Since there is really no agreement to what today’s actual overriding challenges are (Islamic radicalism, terrorism, climate change, the global competition for energy resources, the rise of China, or even a resurgent Russia), I think we are seeing, and will see in future US administrations, the US government trying to manage international relations in a manner that does not easily fit into one, single doctrine.”*
- *“Just as Kennan’s paradigm shifted over time (Containment changed eventually to détente, and so on), perhaps it is too late to look for a replacement for Kennan in the post Cold War period; we might be on Paradigm 2.0 or later by now. Looking for the one true thing could blind us to the fact that we live in pluralist times. Many of the assumptions about Communism in the Long Telegram were wrong (such as the monolithic nature of the ‘Bloc’), and arguably, then as much as later, the degree to which the Soviets were after ‘expansion through world revolution’ rather than ‘security through annexation.’”*

2. Do We Really Need to Go Through This Drill?: But our skeptics were actually in the minority. Most participants (Chart 1) thought that the world does, indeed need a doctrine to replace containment, and were willing to think through what it might be.



Commentary:

- One individual in the disagree category was generally skeptical of doctrine: *“Doctrines are dangerous. Containment was used to justify all manner of policies Kennan himself did not agree with. But most significantly, none of the authors makes a real effort to match means with ends, in my opinion the chief challenge for U.S. policymakers.”*
- A strongly disagree wanted to update containment and launched straight into how to do so: *“Although non-state entities can effectively wage guerrilla, terrorist warfare, under current conditions of banking and trade, the organization and powers of a sovereign state are necessary to wage an offensive war against one or more other sovereign states. Containment strategies can work effectively against individual states and pre-emptive intervention can preserve the sovereignty of individual states against international non-state entities. This strategy must encompass capabilities for infrastructure and state building, as well as overwhelming air, sea, and ground military superiority, either in the U.S. or in its alliances.”*
- Another disagree urged **“strategic patience”** instead of a new doctrine, although this could itself be seen as something approximating doctrine: *“Containment was a response to an extant, existential threat to the United States. Although the threat of Islamic terrorism ought not be understated, it also ought not be overstated -- Islamic terrorism is an extant threat with serious implications, but it is not an existential one. Similarly, the US is not confronting another competitor on the scale of the USSR – China, India, the EU, all remain nascent rather than realized competitors. This may of necessity be an era of strategic patience for the United States, wherein rather than confronting an identified antagonist, we seek instead to contain threats – from state and non-state actors alike – by tightening and improving international and domestic security structures: securing fissile materials; improving intelligence capabilities; attacking terrorist infrastructures; rationalizing the defense infrastructure.”*
- Another disagree said *“present threats – including terrorism – are not of the existential character necessary to justify the development of such a doctrine,”* and another in a similar vein wrote *“the containment doctrine has an effective use for the U.S. as it relates to state actors. Clearly, the definition of what we are containing is changed (i.e. global militant Islam/loose nukes versus Communism), but the concept of containment as an approach remains valid.”*
- A strongly agree clarified that *“containment was never the world’s doctrine, just the US.”*
- One disagree (the disagrees had the most to say) thought we need something, just not a single doctrine: *“Containment had a single focus and purpose. We likely need something: clear policies, goals, a vision – the name doesn’t matter – to counter the major threats facing us. That said, just as containment couldn’t and didn’t address all challenges, neither will*

any future doctrine. Attempts to find a single doctrine risk causing us to ignore things that don't fit within the portfolio of our chosen doctrine. Goals, principles, and strategies are good, but we should NOT reify them to the point that they become constraints or blinders. Moreover, we are not in a position to dictate global doctrine as we were when Kennan developed containment. Most threats require a cooperative approach.”

- *And a final disagree thought the current threat would be better managed by something akin to containment than something new: “It took 40 years, but with some additional pressure at the end, it eventually brought about the total and relatively non-violent collapse of an enemy who was far better armed and organized than the collection of malcontents willing to attempt to do harm to the Western world today. The current crop of Islamists suffer from a comparable problem: their rejection of basic human freedom limits the human resources at their disposal, which in turn limits their potential to do harm to us. Just as containment stranded people behind the Iron Curtain, containment of the Islamists would strand people who don't like wearing burqas, and who deserve better. Sharper convictions about the stupidity of communism, and a greater willingness to apply pressure, might have brought about a swifter collapse during the Cold War. On the other hand, recent experiences in places like Afghanistan and Iraq indicates that places like these are not the Czech Republic – countries yearning to embrace capitalism and liberal government but for the Taliban and the Ba'athists.”*


3. Exactly What is it We are Looking For?: The question of just what doctrine is and where it fits vis-à-vis grand strategy (Chart 2) seemed to some a fruitless exercise in semantics and the participants were split on whether grand strategy flows from doctrine or the reverse. But is this really something that should be open for discussion, or is it a function of contemporary intellectual drift? The ordering of strategy, operational art, and tactics, is not open to discussion at Ft. Leavenworth, but is well established in military doctrine. This question would appear to need some work.

Commentary:

A. Doctrine from Grand Strategy:

- *“Grand Strategy employs an understanding of the current state of affairs (preferably an accurate understanding) as well as a vision of ideal future state and the means and method to achieve that goal. From this Grand Strategy, you develop the Doctrine to guide your actions.”*
- *“In the case of containment, doctrine flows from strategy. Containment is the lower-cost, less risky approach; rather than crushing evil wherever it is found, box it in and let it collapse on its own. That's not the noble solution, just the more feasible one.”*

- *“A proper Grand Strategy links ends, ways, means, and risks in a coherent scheme. Doctrine is another term for a way to achieve the ends. You can’t develop doctrine without first determining the grand strategic ends – What are you trying to accomplish? What do you want the world to look like when you are done?”*



- *“Doctrine is a general statement of a core principle. Grand Strategy is a statement in broad terms of how the principle – the objective – will be achieved.”*
- *“Strategy entails the conscious and purposeful identification of an objective, and doctrine the means necessary to achieve it.”*

B. Grand Strategy from Doctrine:

- *“If doctrine means knowing who we are, what we want, who is our enemy, what our enemy wants, then it is impossible to devise a strategy without defining a doctrine.”*
- *“Doctrine provides the underlying intellectual principles to grand strategy. Global strategy is the road map for implementing doctrine.”*
- *“Doctrine is a grand guiding principle or vision and strategy is the means by which we pursue that principle.”*
- *“Grand Strategy implements the doctrine. Doctrine assesses the situation and provides guiding principles for action. Strategy identifies the tasks, the resources required for their completion and details their execution.”*

- *“Strategy articulates how you go about achieving your doctrine – say keeping Euros out of the New World.”*
- *“Webster says **doctrine is ‘a statement of fundamental government policy, especially in international relations.’ Strategy is: ‘the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war.’** If doctrine is the statement of policy, and strategy offers support to the policy, **doctrine trumps strategy, even grand strategy.** That said, some of our ‘doctrines’ have been less than fundamental government policy, e.g. Nixon or Carter doctrines, and could have been more the work of clever speechwriters. Truman and Monroe by the higher standard are the only real doctrines. Still, strategy was a question of how to effectively implement those doctrines.”*


C. Other Views:

- *“With the world in a state of transformation there is a need for an iterative approach to define grand strategy and doctrine. At this point in time the process is not linear. Once one can gain a better understanding of the new “interconnected world” then it is most likely that grand strategy will flow from doctrine.”*
- *“Both doctrine and grand strategy emerge from an ongoing discourse among foreign policy elites, who make unending efforts to update and reconcile each (note Gaddis on the constant evolution of the Containment doctrine throughout the Cold War).”*

4. Why No Post-Containment Doctrine?: When asked why we haven’t settled on a doctrine like containment for the post Cold War world (Chart 3), participants were divided as to whether it is because the world is simply too complex and the threat too diverse, or whether there are various supply problems – we need a doctrine but the world simply hasn’t produced a Kennan, or demand problems – policymakers don’t want to be boxed in or won’t accept a doctrine that doesn’t conform to their ideological outlook.

Commentary:


- One participant who thought the world is too complex said *“our relationship with states are complex and there are several key relationship, particularly China and Pakistan, where our definition of them as ‘friend’ or ‘foe’ varies by issue, continues to evolve, and it remains unclear what the relationship might be in the medium-term.”*
- Another individual thought that *“the world is changing fast and has not settled enough to allow for a new doctrine.”*



- One blamed the lack of an agreed doctrine on *“ideological and narrowly focused leadership.”*
- Another blamed lack of consensus: *“the American elites seem too fractured ideologically and politically to generate and maintain the necessary level of consensus.”*
- One individual who believed all the options play a part said: *“America’s experience since it emerged on the world state in 1898 has been in fighting ‘isms’ attached to nation states: Spanish colonialism, German militarism, European fascism, Bolshevik communism. It was not culturally ready for an ism without a state sponsor – hence in part the mistaken invasion of Iraq that tied al Qaeda and Islamist terrorism to Saddam Hussein. Many of the errors in US policy of the last twenty years can be attributed to responses that failed to understand the new context. To get a Kennan there needs to be both the person and the context. Kennan had both the background and an Administration willing to listen, and the threat he was describing was relatively consistent with experience. The post-1989 world would have been more familiar to British and European governments of the late 19th century than to today’s Americans: the deracinated anarchist intelligentsia using bombs to express their rage against world-spanning power have much in common with today’s suicide bombers.”*

5. The Threat Picture: Containment started with an accurate picture of the threat, something that does not produce consensus today. The threats that were articulated were in several categories and each category had several sub-categories. They included the following (chart 4):

- Country Specific: Russia, Pakistan, China, Iran.
- Terrorism/Radical Islamism: expressed in a wide variety of ways including prominently terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.
- Global Trends: interconnectedness, global disorder, energy security, collapse of state system, collapse of American power, loss of confidence by the west, economic shifts, mixed.
- None or no Answer: many participants suggested that there is simply no way to articulate a single threat or even a clear threat picture.




Commentary:

- *“Global disorder (anarchy in the realist sense of the term.)”*
- *“No single clear threat, but rather a multiplicity of threats that could be divided into near-term catastrophic and long-term (potentially) catastrophic. These certainly include the current global salafist-jihadist movement, nuclear proliferation, HIV/AIDS and potentially global warming. By focusing solely on one, we will miss another.”*
- *“Sub-national groups with apocalyptic goals, who possess weapons of atomized destructive power.”*
- *“Not sure there is one. Jihadism is important and needs to be dealt with, but I just do not buy the idea that the threat jihadism poses is on the order of the USSR. I believe the current international environment still offers more opportunity than danger.”*

- *“The collapse of states and the state system under assault from many directions, including climate change, corruption and organized crime, religious fundamentalism and other fascisms, regionalism and opportunistic adventurism. The state is still the only legitimate receptacle and control on human violence: unless states can control violence within their borders, their neighbors are not safe and will react.”*
- *“Radical Islamism, the Western term for the violent and extremist Salafist, Qutbist, and Kholmeinist ideologies that are heretical perversions of Islam.”*
- *“There isn’t one, and that’s the point. The Soviets had tens of thousands of tanks, and almost as many nuclear weapons. That was scary. The Islamists are mostly a bunch of grumpy men hiding in suqs and caves, trying to steal enough money to assemble a nail bomb or blow up their Shi’ite neighbors.”*
- *“Global Salafi Jihaddism is the most galvanizing currently, although it ignores issues such as Shia radicalism”*
- *“Diverse threats to a US-led economic system that is embedded in broader liberal order, respecting rule of law, human rights, free speech, and equal opportunity.”*
- *“We are so focused on dealing with the centralized goliath. What we are fighting are a million pigmies. This means that, unlike the Soviet era, our new strategy of containment isn’t going to be against something specific (e.g. terror, instability, genocide, etc.), it is going to have to be for something. Maybe in this regard it isn’t a strategy of containment. It is a strategy of preservation.”*
- *“Intelligent strategy requires a lucid evaluation of the enemy. Our problem today is not so much strategic as conceptual. If we based our doctrine on the available evidence, which is massive, we would devise winning strategies. In the simplest terms, strategy means thinking ‘if I do this, he’ll do that and if he does, I’ll do that. . .’ If we don’t allow ourselves to think inside the head of the enemy and report truthfully on his goals, methods, and values, we will keep inventing strategies for another war, another time and place. . . and we could lose this one, that is staring us in the face.”*

6. The New Mr. X: We now arrive at the heart of the survey, who of our 21 candidates is the closest to a modern George Kennan? We allowed participants up to three choices here, and several offered write in candidates as well (see annex for full options). By a healthy margin **Francis Fukuyama led the pack** with his 2004 and 2005 books on state building and Realistic Wilsonianism, both of which focused on the need to strengthen the nation-state system by starting with what goes on inside states themselves. **Honorable mention goes to Parag Khanna**, whose thoughts on new global architecture derive from his forthcoming book The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. This view will undoubtedly get more attention once the book is published; keep an eye out for it. Other runners up were **Richard Haass**, who articulated the view that security and prosperity will be had through genuine global

integration, and **Thomas Barnett**, who lays out a strategy for bringing the dysfunctional parts of the world (the gap) into the well-ordered part (the core).



Write in Candidates: There were a few write-ins worth mentioning as well, one of which we included in the final list of candidates:

- *“Leon Furth -- Forward Engagement: Seeking out and understanding problems in the future that can be addressed now and understanding the impact of global networks on the interconnectivity of every action and thought.”*
- *“Andrew Bacevich -- In his books The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, and American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy, he is hardly professing a doctrine, but I think he most accurately describes what is going on.”*
- *“Michael Vlahos: Build a Better Narrative – In “the Fall of Modernity (The American Conservative, February 2007), Vlahos contends that “we are losing our wars in the Muslim world because our vision of history is at odds with reality.” It is in getting that vision correct that counts, and it may not be about domination, but rather co-existence. Vlahos’s take on*

creating a new narrative may seem distant from Kennan's work, but on closer inspection it is not."

- *"Phillip Bobbitt – The Rise of the Market State (The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History, Alfred Knopf, 2003). Writing before and just after September 11, Bobbitt illustrates a cycle of changes in the paradigm of what states go to war for and how they fight it. The current epoch (his term) is one of the market state, where the state fights wars to ensure the prosperity of its citizens."*
- *"Barak Obama – Joint Security: American security and prosperity depends on the extent we can help foster the security and prosperity of others. Period."*
- *"Nicolas Checa, John Maguire, Jon Barney – New World Disorder: Featured in August 2003 Harvard Business Review. Under the second Bush Administration, the economic and political rationale behind the Washington consensus of the 1990s has unraveled, forcing a radical change in our perceptions of which countries are safe for business. Negotiating this new environment will require companies to evaluate political events more rigorously and more carefully assess the links between political, economic, and financial risk factors. With careful analysis, leaders can better respond to uncertainties of the new world disorder."*
- *"ADM Eric Olson, Commander US Special Operations Command is an advocate of interagency and multinational efforts to defeat radical Islamism, primarily by working indirectly by, with, and through state and non-state partners in a protracted, complex, and violent struggle to support moderate Muslims in their war against Islamic extremists."*


General Commentary:

- *"What is required is a strategy that embodies a 'trident' of 1) international face, 2) an emphasis on liberal international economies, and 3) a clearly understood right to strong military defense. A combination of Zakaria, Shapiro, and Lieber and these three critical elements could be an appropriate move in the right direction in that it is a shift from today's current, floundering strategies and addresses potentially effective, albeit uncomfortable critical elements, elements that include: 1) an honest aggressive emphasis on an international face, 2) necessarily prominent, but limited role for the US where possible, 3) promotion of liberal economies vs. the continued demand for US/Western version of democracy for all, and 4) a well articulated, internationally 'accepted' definition/understanding of self-defense with an understood element of preemption."*
- *"Viewed through the West's perspective, "neo-containment" would only work, at best, until something better and broader came along. Given political change, accelerated by globalization, containment simply can't be forever; it can, at most, provide breathing space while political evolution*

takes its course (as in the Soviet Union). 'Neo-containment,' if it made sense, would only be one tool. It would need to be complemented or balanced by something else, i.e. the desirable kind of political evolution within the contained space. . . it would also need to be complemented by leadership on ideas, and partnership, especially with big emerging nations, if it is to be seen as legitimate. The other main problem with a containment theory is deciding what is to be contained. In descending order of ease of action, is it terror tactics, militant ideologies, grievances that (we tend to believe) fuel extremism, demographic changes, or enhanced education. Possibly, a narrowly focused containment might limit the threat with the greatest potential to take lives (e.g. nuclear proliferation to non-state actors). There might be enough international consensus on that for it to work. But beyond such an approach, it is difficult to see how multidimensional phenomena can be reduced and defined enough to be met with a single response, and hence, a single concept. In some cases, a broad-brush containment approach would actually undermine other goals (e.g. restrictions on immigration that cause economic damage) – in worse case, a broad containment strategy might provoke unity among now disparate, fragmented groups who pose threats."

7. What do Thematic Groupings Tell Us?: While looking at all the candidates evinces a picture of non-consensus, in fact when they are grouped around major themes there is greater clarity (Chart 6). The two most popular categories are those thinkers who posit doctrines related to the need to avert further degradation of the nation-state system, and those who posit new architecture to deal with a broader range of issues. This question of focusing on a single core theme or issue and building a doctrine around it, or focusing on new global systems to deal with a range of issues, is a good one, and worthy of further consideration.


| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| -- Bush Doctrines I & II | 1.5% (Pre-eminence/Preemption, Global Freedom) |
| -- Anti-Doctrine | 4.5% (Murdoch) |
| -- American Primacy/Focus | 12% (Peters, Mandelbaum, Lieber, Hart) |
| -- Neo-Containment | 17% (Meade, Fallows, Shapiro, Kilcullen) |
| -- New Global Architecture | 29% (Haass, Princeton Project, Khanna, Lieven/Hulsman) |
| -- State Building | 36% (Barnett, Ignatieff, Fukuyama, Zakaria) |



8. Are We There Yet?: Participants were then asked whether their candidate and his/her doctrine was at the level of George Kennan in terms of giving us a solid post-containment security doctrine (Chart 7). Only about one out of five did. One participant probably best summed up the hesitation: *“A truly holistic approach that calls for a combination of the necessary elements required to meet today’s security challenges and threats is what is most required. A good rule of thumb is that the truth will always lie somewhere in the middle. . . there is no ‘silver bullet.’”*


Commentary

- One participation said his choice did not reach the level of George Kennan but *“that’s okay!”*
- Another suggested that no single candidate hits it, but an amalgamation of several might: *“Fukuyama describes the context, Haass the approach and process, Fallows the priority issues to be faced. A doctrine that does not do all three is inadequate.”*



- One said *“to find a Kennan-level diagnosis and prescription would require that the author have an intimate understanding of the sources of all the threats to the US. It was easier in Kennan’s time, because the threats were concentrated. Today, it would require deep understanding of a myriad of regimes, political movements, and economic realities. It is hard to imagine anyone possessing such breadth and depth.”*

9. A U.S. or International Concept?: After considering accompanying commentaries the divide here appears to be artificial. Those who opted for a US concept were acknowledging that security doctrines practically by definition must be developed by a single nation in order to be effective, while those in the international camp argued that even if developed by the U.S., in today’s world it will not be effective without full international buy in.



Commentary:

- *“US must lead development of the consensus and the strategy, but the execution must be international. The US is necessary but insufficient.”*
- *“International but with U.S. leading the effort.”*
- *“U.S. lead but unless we get international buy-in, nothing lasting can be achieved. Surely this is the lesson of the last years.”*
- *“International – mandatory.”*
- *“It will be next to impossible to create a doctrine via an international approach. Notwithstanding this situation the U.S. should take into account the interconnectedness of today’s world in creating a new doctrine. A doctrine that only addresses terrorism will not suffice.”*
- *“The U.S., with 5% of the world’s population, is still, at the end of the day, indispensable in every key area. But the balance is shifting towards others, and the world senses this. With the time remaining in which the US remains well ahead, it should acknowledge this change and take advantage of its influence to lay the foundations, especially with the major emerging powers, of a new system of global management. It means that the U.S. will have to share power (e.g. law of the sea), and acknowledge the interests of other players to a greater degree. . . To maintain leadership, the US will need to admit non-Western countries to the ‘club,’ expecting that they will play by the rules, share in the benefits of self-governance, but also pay the dues when the time comes.”*

10. Venues for Developing an International Doctrine: Whether the new doctrine starts with the U.S. or is developed directly in the international sphere, participants suggested several possible venues for developing it, none of which were very convincing:


- Concert/Alliance of democracies, then UN, regional organizations, and ad coalitions.
- US leads nations with similar values
- New NATO
- UN + regional organizations
- US then NATO
- Summit and coalition of like minded states
- UN, G-8, OSCE, NATO
- Consortium of the main superpowers

This is an area that appears to need real work. One of the more thoughtful responses was as follows: *“UN has many campaigns against many threats (poverty, Aids, TB, terrorism, nuclear proliferation), so how would neo-containment deal with these, all of which are elements of the threat to be contained? Similarly, G-8 has already got many related initiatives underway. NATO and other regional organizations could join with a doctrine (new “strategic concept in NATO-speak) but the driving force for its articulation and credibility*

would have to be the US. So, the answer is for the US to lead in developing the concept, but ensure that others (especially P5, perhaps India, EU and other western allies) contribute to its intellectual elaboration and then commit resources through organizations (UN, NATO, OAS, OAU, OSCE) or bilaterally. **In other words, a sui generis process would be needed, not a single event or organization.**

Another participant argued for a “concert/alliance of democracies for setting security and political objectives and then working through the UN, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions as necessary to obtain them. WTO and IFIs for setting and obtaining economic objectives.”

11. A Presidential Doctrine?: Containment was embedded in the Truman Doctrine, which remained the centerpiece of U.S. doctrine through the succeeding seven administrations until the Berlin Wall fell. It was also the core of NATO’s organizational and warfighting conceptual framework, and thus the de facto doctrine for the West in the fight against communist expansion. Participants felt that the embrace of a U.S. president was no less important today in giving strength to a new doctrine (Chart 9).



Commentary:

- “Right, wrong, or indifferent, the current status and capabilities of the United States make it a pivotal player/global player power broker. As such, the level of acceptance/resistance on behalf of the US President/Congress will impact the US political system, and therefore, to varying degrees impact the international community’s understanding of the validity/viability of any ‘international grand strategy.’”

- *“A doctrine has not meaning outside of the nation state. There is no global consensus on anything – ideological, political, or anything else – which could serve as the basis for a doctrine on anything.”*
- *“The problem is not that it is embraced by the US president. What matters more is how the US president translates that support into action. The world doesn’t listen anymore, it watches.”*
- *“Policy is often initiated and shaped by levels below POTUS, and such a broad-reaching doctrine/strategy must have broad bi-partisan support that transcends the tenure of any specific administration. Containment succeeded through broad continuity from Truman to Reagan, and any president would have had a difficult time re-shaping policy implementation and international institutions in a contrary direction.”*
- *“It will make a difference if embraced by the US president in the sense that common visions are the best way to bring people together in unity of purpose – something that is sorely lacking today. Doctrine for the sake of doctrine makes little difference and may just as likely be bad as good.”*
- *“As the world’s only superpower, and with a history of foreign policy action not solely determined by pragmatism, the involvement of the U.S. is absolutely essential given that no other nation or international organization could or would realize a global doctrine itself.”*

Appendix -- The X Contenders -- 2007

1. **Bush Doctrine I – Pre-eminence and Preemption**: In the first national security plan following the September 11th attacks, the National Security Strategy of 2002 outlines the Bush administration’s policies of pre-eminence and preemption, stating that “while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.” It expands the definition of preemption to encompass not just the ability to attack when there is an imminent threat, but also the ability to begin a preventive war to stop a future threat -- “As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.”
2. **Bush Doctrine II – Global Freedom**: Bush’s second inaugural address (January 2005) outlines a doctrine in which creating peace and setting the conditions for security means spreading democracy. The problem is that while “whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny - prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder - violence will gather, and multiply in destructive power, and cross the most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat.” The only force to stop this threat is the force of worldwide human freedom. In order to achieve this freedom, the policy of the United States must be “to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.” The final result will be “ending tyranny in our world.”
3. **Haass -- Unity and Integration**: In The Opportunity – America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course (Public Affairs, 2005) CFR President and former State Department Policy Planning Director Richard Haass rejects earlier suggestions for a Bush Doctrine – unilateralism or isolationism (unrealistic given the nature of the world), counter-terrorism (too narrow), promoting democracy (too impractical). He calls instead for a doctrine that would broadly integrate the nations of the world “in efforts to tame the challenges inherent in globalization and the post Cold War World. . .The opportunity exists for our era to become one of genuine global integration. . .From terrorism, to WMD, to human crisis, to energy and global economy, the answer is more integration – commitment to a process, not a single policy.”
4. **Barnett – The Core and the Gap**: Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of The Pentagon’s New Map, War and Peace in the Twenty First Century (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), believes that the world’s unsettling security picture stems from a growing divide between the connected and functional “Core”

and the disconnected and dysfunctional “Gap.” Barnett’s key prescription is simply to shrink the Gap, bringing the disconnected parts of the world into the Core in terms of economic prosperity, information flow, and security alignments. He outlines a “global transaction strategy” that “recognizes the primacy of the four global flows of people, energy, investments, and security.” U.S. armed forces are organized on two tracks -- “system administrator” for nation-building, and Leviathan, to crush foes.

5. **Meade – Forward Containment:** CFR’s Walter Russell Meade (Power, Terror, Peace, and War, America’s Grand Strategy in a World at Risk; Alfred A. Knopf, 2004) takes the rationale that containment served us so well that our best approach now would be to adapt it to the new realities rather than start from scratch with a new doctrine. He proposes a version of the triple containment that defeated communism -- contain Soviet military power, box in friendly governments, and limit influence on civil society. The new strategy would: 1) Contain terrorists by directly weakening organizations, cutting ties to governments, and blocking access to WMD; 2) Contain expansion and consolidation of state power by those embracing the ideology of terror, leaving open regime change as an option; and 3) Contain influence of terrorist ideologies with a flow of new ideas and by fixing the Arab-Israeli conundrum.
6. **Hart – The Fourth Power, Principle-Based Leadership:** In The Fourth Power – A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford, 2004), former U.S. Senator Gary Hart expresses the belief that a return to principle-based leadership by the United States would be so compelling that it would itself provide us with security and go far in solving the problems we face. He eschews doctrine, but provides a framework for new policies, based on the mission statement: “*to transform our domestic economy from one of consumption to one of production and, through long-term investment, to recapitalize our education and technology base and achieve energy security; to use the forces of globalization and information to strengthen and expand existing democratic alliances and create new ones; to employ those alliances to destroy terrorist networks and establish new security structures; and guided by our historic principles, to lead international coalitions in spreading economic opportunity and liberal democracy and in nation-building, counter-proliferation, and environmental protection.*”
7. **Fallows – A Containment Strategy for the Age of Terror:** Like Meade, the Atlantic’s James Fallows (“Success Without Victory,” The Atlantic, January/February 2005) believes that our age is more similar than dissimilar to that of the immediate post-war period and argues for a strategy that would focus on three broad themes, which he couches in terms of the leadership that would be required to deliver them. “A Truman

- would tell us that loose-nukes are the real emergency of this moment, and that instead of pussyfooting around we should control them right away. A Kennan would explain the sources of Muslim extremist behavior and how our actions could encourage or retard it. A Marshall would point out how gravely we left ourselves exposed through our reliance on oil from the Persian Gulf.” Our actions should take place against a backdrop of a “courageous, confident, open society” which is “a goal in itself.”
8. **Murdoch – Anti-Doctrine, or Just Do it Right:** In a unique approach that could be said to have support from the 9/11 Commission and undoubtedly some anti-doctrine policymakers, CSIS’s Clarke Murdoch (Improving the Practice of National Security – A New Approach for the Post-Cold War World; CSIS, 2004) believes that “it is not a lack of specific grand strategy to replace containment that is the problem, but the uneven effectiveness with which NSS practitioners make and implement strategy.” He supports the old Army adage that a good plan poorly executed is worse than a mediocre plan well executed, arguing that “the sustainability of U.S. national security strategy depends primarily on whether NSS practitioners get the strategy right.” He has since followed this up with suggestions for going “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” in a paper that similarly lays out specific recommendation for further enhancing the inter-agency environment for results-focused policy execution. The 9/11 report similarly does not attempt to chart doctrine as much as a one-time strategy for attacking terrorists and their organizations, preventing the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and protecting and preparing for terrorist attacks.
 9. **Peters – Extending American Primacy:** In his latest offering (New Glory – Expanding America’s Global Supremacy; Sentinel, 2005), the provocative Ralph Peters begins with the premise that America “is the greatest – and most virtuous – power in history.” Though difficult to pin down precisely, Peter’s would use that virtue to expand raw U.S. power (mostly military) in a web of alliances that reminds one of the New Europe Strategy of the early days of the Iraq War, when America dismissed standing alliances in the interest of putting together a posse of like-minded countries. Peters would do this on a global scale, turning “our attention from the lands of yesterday and extending a hand to the struggling lands of tomorrow.” His proscription for the Middle East captures the flavor of the strategy: “engagement where there is hope; containment where there is no hope; preventive military action against terrorists. . .” It goes beyond America first, it is America only.
 10. **Mandelbaum – America as World Government:** Johns Hopkins Professor Michael Mandelbaum (The Case for Goliath, How America Acts as World Government in the 21st Century, Perseus, 2005), takes a more subtle approach to American primacy, arguing that “the world needs

government and the United States is in a position to supply it.” The rise of American power during the long struggle against the Soviet Union, combined with the failure of Europe to recover its footing, the crash of the Russian empire, and the inability of international organizations to fully function, left the U.S. as the “best source of global governance because, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, there is no other.” Mandelbaum argues that absent this U.S. role the world would be a less secure, less prosperous, and less democratic place, and the U.S. (and the world) would do well to guard this role and help facilitate it, rather than grousing about it. Consider also Niall Ferguson’s *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire*.

11. **Lieber – America as World Leader:** Georgetown University Professor Robert J. Lieber (*The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, Cambridge, 2005) also sees the U.S. as the indispensable player in international security in an age when the potential merger of militant Islamists with weapons of mass destruction could pose threats on a scale previously unimaginable. He dismisses the U.N. and other international bodies as being incapable of acting in a timely and effective way to curb these threats, and believes the absence of a true central authority in the international system forces the U.S. to act as world leader. “American intervention becomes a necessity, not something about which to be apologetic.”
12. **Shapiro – Containment Redux:** While some have looked to George Kennan for inspiration, Yale Professor Ian Shapiro (*Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror*, Princeton, 2007) formulates an entire doctrine by directly adapting Kennan’s ideas to the current world. Shapiro finds the current threat more dangerous and complicated than the monolithic Soviet threat, but in how Islamist terrorists have positioned themselves as being antithetical to our way of life, it has far more in common than the architects of the Bush Doctrine have, to date, accepted. As opposed to the push for, or acceptance of, American primacy in the world, an offensive strategy, Shapiro argues for a very moderated role that would intervene only defensively to secure America’s survival as a democracy. It would have America “guard against terrorism by containing enabling states, investing in human intelligence, and enhancing homeland security.” It would “gear military alliances and collective defense agreements first to America’s survival as a democracy and then to the defense of other democracies.” Finally, it would “support democratic oppositions against dictatorships around the world, and sow the seeds of an environment friendly to democracy by promoting economic development in poor countries.”
13. **Kilcullen – Disaggregation:** Australian policy analyst David Kilcullen (*Countering Global Insurgency*, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, August

2005), offers a unifying strategic conception for winning the War on Terrorism, which he narrowly describes as a “globalized Islamist insurgency,” rather than a conventional terrorism campaign, the difference being largely in the level and modalities of global support networks. Kilcullen argues for a strategy of “disaggregation,” that “seeks to dismantle, or break, the links in the Global jihad.” He explains that “like containment in the Cold War, a disaggregation strategy means different things in different theatres or at different times. Disaggregation focuses on interdicting links between theaters, denying the ability of regional and global actors to link and exploit local actors, disrupting flows between and within jihad theaters, denying sanctuary areas, isolating Islamists from local populations and disrupting inputs from the sources of Islamism in the great Middle East.” It works at the global, regional, and local levels – “seeking to interdict global links via a worldwide CORDS program, isolate regional players through a series of regional counterinsurgencies and strengthen local governance through a greatly enhanced security framework at the country level.”

14. **Ignatieff – Post-Westphalianism**: Embedded in his award winning 2002 Gifford Lectures, former Harvard Professor and now Deputy Leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff (The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Penguin, 2004), identified Al Qaeda as a distinctive kind of terrorism and a wholly new threat. The “apocalyptic nihilists” who attacked America on 9/11 defended their actions “in the language of Islamic eschatology, not in the language of rights,” with apocalyptic, not political intentions. “Such an attack cannot be met by politics but only by war,” he suggests. He places this in historical perspective: “A long historical parenthesis – the ascendancy of the modern state – might be closing. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 . . . international order has depended on state’s possessing a monopoly on the legitimate means of force.” This era, he suggests, may be ending with the rise in non-state actors with the power to destroy cities. The geography of the new threat is the band of failed and failing states running across Africa and on the periphery of the former Soviet Union. The answer is to keep destructive power firmly in the state system where it can be deterred, by ensuring states have “effective coercive control over their own territory.” He lays out a strategy for non-proliferation and control of nuclear materials, state-building, enhanced multilateral and multinational cooperation, while holding out the use of preemptive force “to prevent the sale or distribution of such weapons to non-state actors.” See also Phillip Bobbitt’s The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History.
15. **Fukuyama I – State Building**: Francis Fukuyama believes that the greatest threat to international security comes from unstable states (State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Cornell University Press, 2004). The foreign policy of the United States, then,

- should be one which fosters development, better organization of private and public sectors, and lasting political and economic institutions in those regions which are most prone to instability and corruption by outside influence. The organization and infrastructure of the state must be able to survive after outside aid and intervention is withdrawn.
16. **Fukuyama II – Realistic Wilsonianism**: In a later critique of the neo-conservative movement which he once found himself a part of, Fukuyama posits in America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (Yale University Press, 2005), that “the world is characterized by American hegemony and a global anti-American backlash, complete with inchoate forms of ‘soft’ balancing; a shift in the locus of action away from nation-states toward non-state actors and other transnational forces; an accompanying disintegration of sovereignty both as a normative principle and as an empirical reality; and the emergence of a band of weak and failed states that are the source of most global problems.” Realistic Wilsonianism, or what could be called “hard-headed Liberal Internationalism” would use American power to change what goes on inside states, albeit through a “dramatic demilitarization of American foreign policy and reemphasis on other types of policy instruments.” It would focus on “good governance, political accountability, democracy, and strong institutions,” through soft power: our ability to set an example, to train and educate, to support with advice and often with money.” And it would not be afraid of new institutions – “a large number of overlapping and sometimes competitive international institutions, what can be labeled ‘multi-multilateralism.’”
 17. **Lieven/Hulsman -- Ethical Realism**: Anatol Lieven, a senior researcher at the New America Foundation, and John Hulsman, a member of Council on Foreign Relations and former senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation come together from opposite ends of the political spectrum to formulate a unique foreign policy they call ethical realism (Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World. Pantheon, 2006). The policy is defined by five “core teachings:” prudence, humility, study, responsibility, and patriotism. Lieven and Hulsman propose spreading capitalism before spreading democracy, and ultimately strive for an international order which does not call for preventive war, citing containment of communism in the Soviet Union as a prime example to follow.
 18. **Princeton Project – A World of Liberty Under Law**: Reasoning that it would take a number of individuals to do “what no one person in our highly specialized and rapidly changing world could hope to do alone,” Woodrow Wilson School Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter and Wilson School professor G. John Ikenberry, serving as co-chairs of the Princeton Project on National Security, engaged some 400 policymakers and academics with the aim to write a “collective X article.” The final report argues for “an

American grand strategy of forging a world of liberty under law by supporting popular, accountable, and rights-regarding governments; building a liberal international order; and updating rules on the use of force.” The report has new ideas for nation-building (supporting Popular, Accountable, and Rights-regarding governments worldwide), rebuilding international institutions through a Concert of Democracies, and countering terrorism through a global counterinsurgency campaign. It similarly pulls in new ideas on nuclear proliferation, global pandemics, energy security, and building a protective infrastructure.

19. **Zakaria -- Liberalization before Democratization**: Zakaria finds fault with doctrines that blindly promote democracy, something he believes is not an inherently good or bad as a political system (The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. W.W. Norton and Company, 2004). He triumphs liberal values, whether or not they come attached to a democracy, and contends countries that first liberalized their economies were better off in the long run than countries that first promoted democracy and then worked for liberal values. Zakaria discusses the “paradox” of Iraq: “to build democracy in Iraq, the United States must stay on, but to demonstrate that it is not a colonial power it must leave.” Involving other countries in the process, he proposes, will solve this problem.
20. **Louise Richardson -- Define and Contain**: Louise Richardson, Dean of the Radcliffe Institute, proposes that a war against the terrorist threat is futile because it is essentially a war against a tactic. (What Terrorists Want. Random House, 2006). “Terrorist” tactics were used by Americans against the British in the 1770's, by the Israelis against the British, by the Algerians against the French. Progress is only possible if the problem is clearly defined “as global militant Islam.” Richardson proposes that the roots of terrorism are too varied to defeat, but that they can be contained by isolating terrorist groups from their communities through a “war of ideas.” Without a broad appeal in their communities, recruitment for terrorist groups will decline. The audiences for coercive and conciliatory policies must be kept separate, in that “Coercive policies should be restricted to the few actual perpetrators of the violence, while conciliatory policies ought to be focused on their potential recruits.”
21. **Parag Khanna -- New Global Order**: In The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (Random House, 2008) Khanna argues that America's unipolar moment has been replaced by a tripolar world order in which the US, China, and the EU compete on increasingly equal footing. (Other great powers do not meet the criteria of a superpower nor does the concept of a global Islamist jihadism.) Military power alone is a false indicator of aggregate influence. Each superpower combines hard and soft power in unique ways to influence events in every

corner of the globe, specifically in the most strategic "second world" regions of South America, the Middle East, the Black Sea region, Central Asia, and East Asia. America's diplomatic style is "coalition," the EU's is "consensus," and China's is "consultative". Success or failure to win the allegiance of second world state-regions will ultimately tip the global balance of power. The 21st century is the first in which truly global multi-polar competition has ever occurred, with not all superpowers being Western (e.g. China), and not all even being traditional nation-states (e.g. the EU). Maintaining stability thus requires not a tenuous "balance of power" or a culturally unachievable "concert," but rather a system of "equilibrium" based on an active division of labor among the Big 3 to manage differences while reestablishing the foundation of shared norms which is rapidly eroding.

Keith Mines is Deputy Political Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa and a founding member of the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs. He has served with the Foreign Service in Tel Aviv, San Salvador, Port-au-Prince, Budapest, and Washington and done short tours in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Darfur. Mr. Mines is a former Special Forces Officer with service in Ft. Bragg and Honduras, and maintains a reserve commission in the Infantry. He is the winner of the American Foreign Service Association's Rivkin Award for Creative Dissent in 2004 for new approaches to the Iraq conflict. Mr. Mines was educated at Brigham Young University and Georgetown.